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Abstract
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a
set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost
and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to select a subset of items
with the total cost not exceeding the budget, in a way that is consistent with the voters’
preferences. Since the preferences of the voters over the items can vary significantly, we
need a way of aggregating these preferences, in order to select the socially best valid
knapsack. We study three approaches to aggregating voters’ preferences, which are
motivated by the literature on multiwinner elections and fair allocation. This way we
introduce the concepts of individually best, diverse, and fair knapsack. We study the
computational complexity (including parameterized complexity, and complexity under
restricted domains) of the aforementioned multiagent variants of knapsack.
1 Introduction
In the classic knapsack problem we are given a set of items, each having a cost and a
value, and a budget. The goal is to find a subset of items with the maximal sum of the
values subject to the constraint that the total cost of the selected items must not exceed
the budget. In this paper we are studying the following variant of the knapsack problem:
instead of having a single objective value for each item we assume that there is a set
of agents (also referred to as voters) who have potentially different valuations (expressed
through utilities) of the items. When choosing a subset of items we want to take into
account possibly conflicting preferences of the voters with respect to which items should be
∗This research was initiated within the student project “Research in Teams” organized by the research
group Algorithmics and Computational Complexity of TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
†Supported by the DFG, projects DAMM (NI 369/13) and TORE (NI 369/18).
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by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: ”Normative Comparison
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selected: in this paper we discuss three different approaches to how the voters’ valuations
can be aggregated.
Multiagent knapsack forms an abstract model for a number of real-life scenarios. First,
let us note that if the costs of the items are all the same, then the multiagent knapsack
model collapses to the model for multiwinner elections [16] (in the literature on multiwinner
elections, items are often called candidates). Multiwinner voting rules are applicable in
a broad class of scenarios, ranging from selecting a representative committee of experts,
through recommendation systems [25]1, to resource allocation and facility location problems.
In each of these settings it is quite natural to consider that different items/candidates
can incur different costs. Further, algorithms for multiagent knapsack can be viewed as
tools for the participatory budgeting problem [7], where the authorities aggregate citizens’
preferences in order to decide which of the potential local projects should obtain funding.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to aggregate voters’ preferences is to select a
subset (a knapsack) that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all the voters over all selected
items. This approach—which we call selecting an individually best knapsack—subject to
differences in methods used for eliciting voters’ preferences has been taken by Benabbou
and Perny [2], and in the context of participatory budgeting by Goel et al. [21] and Be-
nade et al. [3]. However, by selecting an individually best knapsack we can disadvantage
even large minorities of voters, which is illustrated by the following example: assume that
the set of items can be divided into two subsets A1 and A2, that all items have the same
cost, and that 51% of the voters like items from A1 (assigning the utility of 1 to them, and
the utility of 0 to the other items) and the remaining 49% of voters like only items from
A2. An individually best knapsack would contain only items from A1, that is 49% of the
voters would be effectively disregarded.
In this paper we introduce two other approaches to aggregating voters’ preferences for
selecting a multiagent knapsack. One such approach—which we call selecting a diverse
knapsack—is inspired by the Chamberlin–Courant rule [9] from the literature on multi-
winner voting. Informally speaking, in this approach we aim at maximizing the number
of voters who have at least one preferred item in the selected knapsack. For the second
approach—which is the main focus of the paper and which we call selecting a fair knap-
sack—we use the concept of Nash welfare [28] from the literature on fair allocation. Nash
welfare is a well-established solution concept that implements a tradeoff between having an
objectively efficient resource allocation (knapsack, in our case), and having an allocation
which is acceptable for a large population of agents. Indeed, extensive recent studies in
the domain of fair allocation confirm particularly strong fairness guarantees of Nash wel-
fare [8, 27, 11], and this solution concept has been applied e.g. in the context of public
decision making [10], online resource allocation [19] or transmission congestion control [23]
(therein referred to as proportional fairness). Thus, our work introduces a new application
domain—now the goal is to select a set of shared items—for the concept of Nash welfare.
1An example often described in the literature is when an enterprise considers which set of products should
be pushed to production—it is natural to view such a problem as an instance of multiwinner elections with
products corresponding to the items/candidates and potential customers to the voters.
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In particular, as a side note, we will explain that our approach leads to a new class of mul-
tiwinner rules, which can be viewed as generalizations of the Proportional Approval Voting
rule beyond the approval setting.
Apart from introducing the new class of multiagent knapsack problems, our contribu-
tions are as follows:
(1) We study the complexity of computing an optimal individually best (IB), diverse, and
fair knapsack. This problem is in general NP-hard, except for the case of IB knapsack
with unarily encoded utilities of the voters (as the IB knapsack problem is equivalent to
the classic knapsack problem).
(2) We study the parameterized complexity of computing a diverse and fair knapsack, fo-
cusing on the number of voters.2 We show that for unary-encoded utilities of the voters
computing a diverse knapsack is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the
number of voters. On the contrary, computing a fair knapsack is W[1]-hard for the same
parameter.
(3) We study the complexity of the considered problems for single-peaked and single-crossing
preferences. We show that (under unary encoding of voters’ utilities) a diverse knapsack
can be computed in polynomial time when the preferences are single-peaked or single-
crossing, while computing a fair knapsack remains NP-hard.
Our results are summarized in Table 1. Our main message is that fairness comes with
a surprisingly high computational complexity. Indeed, our most unexpected results are
that computing a fair knapsack is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of voters,
and NP-hard on single-peaked single-crossing domains, with unit-costs, and all utilities
coming from the set {0, . . . , 6}. This was unforeseen since by using a recent result of
Peters [29], one can show that computing a fair knapsack on single-peaked domains (which
are not necessarily single-crossing, i.e., when one of the assumptions is weakened), with unit-
costs, and all utilities coming from the set {0, 1} (instead of {0, . . . , 6}, i.e., when another
assumption is strengthened) is polynomial-time solvable. Our result required a complex
reduction from the exact set cover problem.
Most of the our results are presented for the costs and utilities of the agents given in
the unary-encoding. This makes our results more relevant for practical applications of our
framework. E.g., for participatory budgeting (PB) one does not really need more than
thousands of values to represent utilities/costs. Further, by assuming efficient encoding of
the utilities/costs we would make the hardness results less meaningful—the hardness would
simply be an artifact of the fact that we admit the values of the utilities/costs that are
exponentially large in the number of voters. By assuming unary encoding we make—on the
one hand—the hardness results stronger, and—on the other hand—more applicable to the
real scenarios that our model represents.
2Considering this parameter is relevant, e.g., for the case when the set of voters is in fact a relatively
small group of experts acting on behalf of a larger population of agents.
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Table 1: Overview of our results (for the case of utilities encoded in unary): Herein, SP and
SC abbreviate single-peaked and single-crossing preferences, respectively, and “# voters” refers to
“when parameterized by the number of voters”.
Knapsack general SP SC # voters
IB P (equivalent to Knapsack) ←
Diverse NP-hard [30] P P FPT
(Thm. 4) (Thm. 4) (Thm. 5)
Fair NP-hard NP-hard W[1]-hard
(Thm. 6) (Thm. 10) (Thm. 7)
We also show all three problems to be NP-hard in the non-unary case (Theorems 3
and 6) and prove W-hardness with respect to the budget (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1).
2 The Model
For a pair of natural numbers i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j, by [i, j] we denote the set {i, i + 1, . . . , j}.
Further, we let [j] = [1, j].
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of n voters and A = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of m items.
The voters have preferences over the items, which are represented as a utility profile u =
(ui(a) | i ∈ [n], a ∈ A): for each i ∈ [n] and a ∈ A we use ui(a) to denote the utility that
vi assigns to a; this utility quantifies the extent to which vi enjoys a. We assume that all
utilities are nonnegative integers.
Each item a ∈ A comes with a cost c(a) ∈ N, and we are given a global budget B ∈
N. We call a knapsack a subset S of items whose total cost does not exceed B, that is
c(S) =
∑
a∈S c(a) ≤ B. Our goal is to select a knapsack that would be, in some sense,
most preferred by the voters. Below, we describe three representative rules which extend
the preferences of the individual voters over individual items to their aggregated preferences
over all knapsacks. Each such a rule induces a corresponding method for selecting the best
knapsack. Our rules are rooted in concepts from the literature on fair division and on
multiwinner elections:
Individually best knapsack: this is the knapsack S which maximizes the total utility of
the voters from the selected items uIB(S) =
∑
a∈S
∑
vi∈V
ui(a). This defines perhaps the
most straightforward way to select the knapsack: we call it individually best, because the
formula uIB(S) treats the items separately and does not take into account fairness-related
issues. Indeed, such a knapsack can be very unfair, as discussed in the introduction.
Indeed, such a knapsack can be very unfair, illustrated by the following:
Example 1. Let B be an integer, and consider a set of n = B voters and m = B2 items, all
having a unit cost (c(a) = 1 for each a ∈ A). Let us rename the items so that A = {ax,y |
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x, y ∈ [B]} and consider the following utility profile:
ui(ax,y) =


L+ 1 if i = x = 1
L if i = x 6= 1
0 otherwise,
for some large L ∈ N. In this case, the individually best knapsack is SIB = {a1,y | y ∈ B},
that is it consists only of the items liked by a single voter v1. At the same time, there exists
a much more fair knapsack SFair = {ax,1 | x ∈ B} that for each voter v ∈ V contains an
item liked by v.
Diverse knapsack: this is the knapsack S that maximizes the utility uDiv(S) =∑
vi∈V
maxa∈S ui(a). In words, in the definition of uDiv we assume that each voter
cares only about his or her most preferred item in the knapsack. This approach is
inspired by the Chamberlin–Courant rule [9] for multiwinner elections and by classic
models in facility location [17]. We call such a knapsack diverse following the convention
from the multiwinner literature [16]. Intuitively, such a knapsack represents the diversity
of the opinions among the population of voters; in particular, if the preferences of the
voters are very diverse, such a knapsack tries to incorporate the preferences of as many
groups of voters as possible at the cost of containing only one representative item for
each “similar” group.
Fair knapsack: we use Nash welfare [28] as a solution concept for fairness. Formally, we
call a knapsack S fair if it maximizes the product uFair(S) =
∏
vi∈V
(
1 +
∑
a∈S ui(a)
)
.3
Alternatively, by taking the logarithm of uFair we can represent fair knapsack as the one
maximizing
∑
vi∈V
log(1 +
∑
a∈S ui(a)). The following example intuitively explains the
type of fairness guaranteed by using the Nash welfare.
Example 2. Consider six groups of voters, V1, . . . , V6, with
|V1| = 300, |V2| = 200, |V3| = 100, and
|V4| = |V5| = |V6| = 1.
Assume we have six sufficiently large groups of items, A1 . . . , A6. Each voter from group Vi
assigns utility 1 to all items from group Ai, and zero to all other items. Finally, assume that
3Typically, Nash welfare would be defined as
∏
vi∈V
(∑
a∈S ui(a)
)
. In our definition, we add one to the
sum
∑
a∈S ui(a) in order to avoid pathological situations when the sum is equal to zero for some voters.
This also allows us to represent the expression we optimize as a sum of logarithms, and thus, to expose the
close relation between the fair knapsack and the Proportional Approval Voting rule. When the utilities are
normalized our definition results in better properties of the outcome pertaining to fairness [15]. Further, all
our hardness results can be formulated for a weaker (and perhaps the least disputable) notion of fairness
in the following way: it is hard to decide whether an instance of the collective knapsack problem admits a
solution where the sum of the utilities of all the agents is the highest (among all valid solutions) and all the
agents have the same utility.
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the costs of all items are equal to 1, and that the value of the budget is 6. An individually
best knapsack would consist only of the items from A1. A diverse knapsack would contain
one item from each set Ai for i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. A fair knapsack would contain 3 items from
A1, 2 items from A2 and 1 item from A3—this solution can be interpreted as fair since the
number of items selected from each group is proportional to the number of voters liking
items from these groups.
If we assume that the costs of the items from groups A1, A2, and A3 are equal to 3, 2,
and 1, respectively, and that our budget is equal to 6, then the fair knapsack will consist
of one item from each of the sets A1, A2, and A3—this shows that each group will obtain
a share of the cost of the whole knapsack which is proportional to its size.
In Section 1 we referred to the literature supporting the use of Nash welfare in various
settings. Let us complement these arguments with one additional observation. When the
utilities of the voters come from the binary set {0, 1} and the costs of all items are one, then
our multiagent knapsack framework boils down to the standard multiwinner elections model
with approval preferences. In this case, a very appealing rule, Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV), can be expressed as finding a knapsack maximizing
∑
vi∈V
H(
∑
a∈S ui(a)), where
H(i) is the i-th harmonic number. This is almost equivalent to finding a fair knapsack
(maximizing the Nash welfare) since the harmonic function can be viewed as a discrete
version of the logarithm. Thus, fair knapsack can be considered an adjustment of PAV to
the model with cardinal utilities and costs. In particular (as a side note), observe that the
notion of fair knapsack combined with positional scoring rules induces rules that can be
viewed as adaptations of PAV to the ordinal model.
3 Related Work
Our work extends the literature on the multi-objective (MO) knapsack problem [22], that
is on the variant of the classic knapsack problem with multiple independent functions val-
uating the items. Typically, in the MO knapsack problem the goal is to find a (the set of)
Pareto optimal solution(s) according to multiple objectives defined through given functions
valuating items. Our approach is different since we consider specific forms of aggregating
the objectives; in particular for each of the concepts we study—for the individually best,
diverse, and fair knapsack—there always exists a Pareto optimal solution; further each so-
lution to the individually best and fair knapsack is Pareto optimal. For an overview of
the literature on the MO knapsack problem (with the focus on the analysis of heuristic
algorithms) we refer to the survey by Lust and Teghem [26].
Lu and Boutilier [25] studied a variant of the Chamberlin–Courant rule that includes
knapsack constraints and so being very similar to our diverse knapsack problem. The
difference is that (i) they consider utilities which are extracted from the voters’ preference
rankings, thus these utilities have a specific structure, and (ii) in their model the items are
not shared; instead, the selected items can be copied and distributed among the voters. Lu
and Boutilier consider a model with additional costs related to copying a selected item and
sending it to a voter. Consequently, their general model is more complex than our diverse
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knapsack; they also considered a more specific variant of this model, equivalent to winner
determination under the Chamberlin–Courant rule.
A variant of the diverse knapsack problem with the utilities satisfying a form of the
triangle inequality is known as the knapsack median problem; see the work of Byrka et al. [6]
for a discussion on the approximability of the problem.
As we discussed in the introduction, the multiagent variant of the knapsack problem
has been often considered in the context of participatory budgeting, yet to the best of
our knowledge this literature focuses on the simplest aggregation rule corresponding to
our individually best knapsack approach [7, 21, 3]. Another avenue has been explored by
Fain et al. [14], who studied rules that determine the level of funding provided to different
projects (items, in our nomenclature) rather than rules selecting subsets of projects with
predefined funding requirements.
4 Computing Multiagent Knapsacks
In this section we investigate the computational complexity of finding individually best,
diverse, and fair knapsack. Formally, we define the computational problem for computing
a fair knapsack as:
Fair Knapsack
Input:An instance (V,A, u, c) and a budget B.
Task: Compute a knapsack S ⊆ A such that c(S) ≤ B and uFair(S) is maximum.
We define the computational problems Diverse Knapsack and Individually Best
Knapsack analogously—the difference is only in the expression to maximize, which for
the two problems is uDiv and uIB, respectively. We will use the same names when referring
to the decision variants of these problems; in such cases we will assume that one additional
integer x is given in the input, and that the decision question is whether there exists S with
value uIB(S) (respectively, uDiv(S) or uFair(S)) at least x, and c(S) ≤ B.
We observe that the functions uIB, uDiv, and uFair (when represented as a sum of
logarithms—the use of the logarithm in the objective is only relevant for the approximation
ratio) are submodular. Thus, we can use an algorithm of [32] with the following guarantees.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial-time (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for Individ-
ually Best Knapsack, Diverse Knapsack, and Fair Knapsack with the objective
function log(uFair).
In the remainder of the paper we will focus on computing exact solutions for the three
problems. In particular, we study the complexity under the following two restricted do-
mains:
Single-peaked preferences. Let topi denote vi’s most preferred item, and let ⊳ be an
order of the items. We say that a utility profile u is single-peaked with respect to ⊳ if
for each a, b ∈ A and each vi ∈ V such that a ⊳ b ⊳ topi or topi ⊳ b ⊳ a we have that
ui(b) ≥ ui(a).
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Single-crossing preferences. Let ⊳ be an order of the voters. We say that a utility
profile u is single-crossing with respect to ⊳ if for each two items a, b ∈ A the set
{vi ∈ V | ui(b) ≥ ui(a)} forms a consecutive block according to ⊳.
We say that a profile u is single-peaked (resp., single-crossing) if there exists an order ⊳
of the items (resp., of the voters) such that u is single-peaked (resp., single-crossing) with
respect to ⊳. Note that an order witnessing single-peakedness or single-crossingness can be
computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., [13, 18]).
We will also study the parameterized complexity of the three problems. For a given pa-
rameter p, we say that a problem is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) when parameterized
by p if there is an algorithm (FPT algorithm) that solves each instance I of the problem
in O
(
f(p) · poly(|I|)
)
time, where f is some computable function. In parameterized algo-
rithmics, FPT algorithms are considered efficient. There is a whole hierarchy of complexity
classes, but informally speaking, a problem that is W[1]- or W[2]-hard is assumed not to
be FPT and, hence, hard (or fixed-parameter intractable) from the parameterized point of
view (see [12] for more details).
4.1 Individually Best Knapsack
We start with the simplest case of individually best knapsack.
Theorem 2. Individually Best Knapsack is solvable in polynomial time when the
utilities of voters are unary-encoded.
Proof. Consider an instance (V = {v1, . . . , vn}, A = {a1, . . . , am}, u, c,B), and let uˆ :=∑
vi∈V
∑
a∈A ui(a). We apply dynamic programming with table T , where T [i, x] denotes the
minimal cost of S ⊆ {a1, . . . , ai} with value uIB(S) at least equal to x. We initialize T [i, 0] =
0 for i ∈ [m] and T [0, x] = ∞ for each x ∈ [uˆ]. We define the helper function f(i, x) :=
x−
∑
vj∈V
uj(ai), where i ∈ [m] and x ∈ [uˆ]. For i ∈ [m] and x ∈ [uˆ], we have
T [i, x] = min
(
T [i− 1, x],
c(ai) + T [i− 1,max(0, f(i, x))]
)
.
By precomputing
∑
vj∈V
uj(a) for each a ∈ A, we get a running time of O(nm+muˆ).
Note that if the utilities are not encoded in unary, then Fair Knapsack is NP-hard
even for one voter (see Theorem 6).
4.2 Diverse Knapsack
We now turn our attention to the problem of computing a diverse knapsack. Through
a straightforward reduction from the standard knapsack problem, we get that Diverse
Knapsack is computationally hard even for profiles which are both single-peaked and
single-crossing, unless the utilities are provided in unary encoding.
8
Theorem 3. Diverse Knapsack is NP-hard even for single-peaked and single-crossing
utility profiles.
Proof. We present a many-one reduction from Knapsack. Let (X = {x1, . . . , xn}, x, y) be
an instance of Knapsack where each xi comes with value ν(xi) ≥ 1 and weight ω(xi);
the question is whether there exists S ⊆ X with
∑
xi∈S
ν(xi) ≥ x and
∑
xi∈S
ω(xi) ≤ y.
We set our set of items A = {a1, . . . , an} with c(ai) := ω(xi) for each i ∈ [n]. We add n
voters v1, . . . , vn with
ui(aj) :=


3n2 · ν(aj), i = j,
j, i > j,
2n− j + 1, i < j.
It is immediate that for each S we have that
∑
ai∈S
c(ai) =
∑
xi∈S
ω(xi). Further,∑
vi∈V
maxaj∈S ui(aj) ≥ 3n
2x if and only if
∑
xj∈S
ν(xj) ≥ x, which proves the correctness.
It is immediate to check that the utility profile is single-peaked and single-crossing.
Note that Diverse Knapsack is NP-hard for utilities encoded in unary as it generalizes
the Chamberlin–Courant rule, which is computationally hard [30]. For single-peaked or
single-crossing profiles the Chamberlin-Courant rule is computable in polynomial time [4,
31]. These known algorithms can be extended to the case of the diverse knapsack.
Theorem 4. Diverse Knapsack is solvable in polynomial time when the utility profile is
(i) single-peaked and encoded in unary;
(ii) single-crossing and encoded in unary.
Proof of (i). Consider an input instance (V = {v1, . . . , vn}, A = {a1, . . . , am}, u, c,B),
where A is enumerated such that the order is single-peaked (note that such an ordering can
be computed in polynomial time [13]). Let uˆ :=
∑
vi∈V
∑
a∈A ui(a). We apply dynamic pro-
gramming with table T , where T [i, x] denotes the minimal cost of a subset S ⊆ {a1, . . . , ai}
containing ai (ai ∈ S) with value at least equal to x (uDiv(S) ≥ x). We define the helper
function
f(i, x) :=
{
c(ai), if
∑
vj∈V
uj(ai) ≥ x,
∞, otherwise.
We initialize T [1, x] = f(1, x) for all x ∈ [0, uˆ]. Then we set
T [i, x] = min
(
f [i, x],
c(ai) + min1≤j<i T [j, x− d(i, j)]
)
,
where d(i, j) :=
∑
vℓ∈V
max(0, uℓ(ai)−uℓ(aj)). LetM := {(i, x) | T [i, x] ≤ B}. Then we can
derive the value of the best diverse knapsack from max{x | ∃i : (i, x) ∈ M}. Clearly, when
the utilities are unarily encoded, we can compute all entries of T and set M in polynomial
time.
9
We inductively argue over 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Clearly, the best diverse knapsack over item
set {a1} has cost c(a1). Consider T [i, x] with i > 1. Let Ai ⊆ {a1, . . . , ai} be a set of
items with value at least x of minimal cost containing ai. Then, either Ai = {ai}, or
Ai = Aj ∪ {ai}, where j ∈ [i− 1] with aj ∈ Ai and there is no j
′ ∈ [i− 1] such that aj′ ∈ Ai
and j < j′ < i. In the first case, c(Ai) = c(ai) = f [i, x]. Consider the second case. Clearly,
c(Aj) = c(Ai)− c(ai). Let V1 =
{
vℓ ∈ V | uℓ(aj) ≤ uℓ(ai)
}
and let V2 := V \ V1. From the
single-peakedness, we have that uℓ(ai)−max1≤j′≤j uℓ(aj′) = uℓ(ai)−uℓ(aj), if vℓ ∈ V1, and
clearly uℓ(ai)−max1≤j′≤j uℓ(aj′) < 0, if vℓ ∈ V2. Hence, the value of Ai is greater than the
value of Aj by
∑
vℓ∈V
max(0, uℓ(ai)− uℓ(aj)) = d(i, j).
Theorem 4(i) is proven via straight-forward dynamic programming and omitted due to
space constraints. We prove our result for single-crossingness. Let us define a set of useful
tools. We will also use these tools later on, when analyzing the parameterized complexity
of the problem.
Given a tuple of voters ~V = (v1, . . . , vn) and a subset S ⊆ A of items, we define
an assignment π
S,~V
as a surjection [n] → S. An assignment is called connected, if for
every s ∈ S it holds that π−1
S,~V
(s) := {i ∈ [n] | s = π
S,~V
(i)} = [x, y] for some x, y ∈ [n],
y ≥ x. For our first tool we introduce the following auxiliary problem.
Ordered Diverse Knapsack
Input:An instance (~V ,A, u, c) where ~V = (v1, . . . , vn) is ordered and a budget B.
Task: Compute a knapsack S ⊆ A such that c(S) ≤ B, and uOrd(S) =
maxconnected π
S,~V
∑n
i=1 ui(πS,~V (i)) is maximum.
If S = {s1, . . . , sℓ} ⊆ A is a cost-minimal solution to Diverse Knapsack on (V,A, u, c),
then let Vi := {vj ∈ V | si ∈ argmaxa∈S uj(a)}. Consider an ordering ~V = (V1, . . . , Vℓ),
where for each i ∈ [ℓ], the voters in Vi are arbitrarily ordered. Then it is not difficult to see
that the assignment
π
S,~V
(i) = argmax
a∈S
ui(a)
is connected. Hence, we obtain the following connection between Diverse Knapsack and
Ordered Diverse Knapsack.
Observation 1. There is an ordering ~V on the voters V such that there is an S ⊆ A
that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and for Diverse
Knapsack.
Next, we give a dynamic program for computing knapsacks that qualitatively lie “be-
tween” optimal solutions for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and Diverse Knapsack
(what we mean by “lying in between” is specified later on).
Let us fix an input (V,A, u, c,B) and an ordering ~V = (v1, . . . , vn) of the voters. We
set uˆ :=
∑n
i=1
∑
a∈A ui(a). We give a dynamic program with table T , where T [i, x] denotes
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“some” cost of a knapsack with a value assigned by voters from (v1, . . . , vi) at least equal
to x. We set
T [1, x] = min{c(a) | a ∈ A, u1(a) ≥ x},
if there is an a ∈ A such that u1(a) ≥ x, and T [1, x] = ∞ otherwise. We define a helper
function
f(i, a, x) =
{
c(a), if
∑i
j=1 uj(a) ≥ x,
∞, otherwise.
We set
T [i, x] = min
a∈A

 f(i, a, x),
c(a) + min
j∈[i−1]
T [j,max(0, x−
i∑
ℓ=j+1
uℓ(a))]

 . (1)
Observation 2. When the utilities are unarily encoded, we can compute all entries of T
in polynomial time.
Lemma 1. Let S be a cost-minimal solution to Diverse Knapsack on (V,A, u, c) and
let x = uDiv(S). Then T [n, x] ≥ c(S).
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case, that is, T [n, x] < c(S). Then we construct a
knapsack S′ from T [n, x] as follows. Let a ∈ A be an item that minimizes (1) for T [n, x],
then make a ∈ S′. If T [n, x] = f(n, a, x), then T [n, x] = c(a) < c(S), contradicting the fact
that S is cost-minimal. Otherwise,
T [n, x] = c(a) + T [j, x′ := max(0, x−
n∑
ℓ=j+1
uℓ(a))],
for some j ∈ [n− 1]. Then we proceed towards a contradiction as before: Let a′ ∈ A be an
item that minimizes (1) for T [j, x′], then make a′ ∈ S′, and continue the same reasoning.
Lemma 2. Let S be a cost-minimal solution to Ordered Diverse Knapsack
on (~V ,A, u, c) where ~V is ordered and let x = uOrd(S). Then T [n, x] ≤ c(S).
Proof. Assume S = {s1, . . . , sℓ} being enumerated. Let πS,~V be a connected assignment
such that
∑
vi∈V
ui(πS,~V (i)) = x. Let 0 = i0 < i1 < . . . < iℓ = n be such that [ij+1, ij+1] =
π−1
S,~V
(sj+1) for every 0 ≤ j < ℓ. Moreover, let xj :=
∑ij
i=1 ui(πS,~V (i)), for j ∈ [ℓ]. By our
definition of T , we have that T [i1, x1] ≤ c(s1). Moreover, we have T [i2, x2] ≤ T [i1, x1]+c(s2).
It follows inductively that T [iℓ, xℓ] ≤ c(S).
We have all ingredients at hand to prove our main results.
Proof of Theorem 4(ii). If ~V is an order witnessing single-crossingness, then there is an S ⊆
A that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and for Diverse
Knapsack. Lemmas 1 and 2 guarantee that our algorithm will find it.
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Further, we can use our tools to obtain an FPT algorithm (for the number of voters)
for unrestricted domains.
Theorem 5. Diverse Knapsack is FPT when parameterized by the number of voters and
the utilities are unarily encoded.
Proof. By Observation 1, we know that there is an order ~V on the voters such that there
is an S ⊆ A that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and
for Diverse Knapsack. Together with Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain that for ~V our dynamic
program will find such S. Hence, for each ordering of V , we compute T [n, x]. Then,
we take the minimum over all observed values. Note that x is the largest value such
that T [n, x] ≤ B for some ordering of the voters. Altogether, this yields a running time
of O(n! poly(uˆ+ n+m)) ⊆ O(2n logn poly(uˆ+ n+m)).
Finally, we complement Theorem 5 by proving a lower bound on the running time (via
reducing from the W[2]-complete Dominating Set problem), assuming the Exponential-
Time Hypothesis (ETH).
Proposition 1. Diverse Knapsack with binary utilities and unary costs is W[2]-hard
when parameterized by the budget B and, unless the ETH breaks, there is no 2o(n+m) ·
poly(n+m) algorithm.
Proof. We give a many-one reduction from Dominating Set. An instance of dominating
set consists of a graph G = (W,E) and an integer k; the question is whether there exists
a subset S of at most k vertices such that for each vertex w ∈ W there is an s ∈ S such
that w ∈ NG[s], where NG[s] = {v ∈W | {v, s} ∈ E}∪{s} denotes the closed neighborhood
of s in G. For each vertex w ∈W , we introduce a voter vw to V and an item aw to A of cost
one. We set uvw(aw′) = 1, if w
′ ∈ NG[w], and uvw(aw′) = 0, otherwise. Furthermore, we set
the budget B = k. It is not difficult to see that there is a diverse knapsack S with c(S) ≤ B
and uDiv(S) ≥ n if and only if (G, k) is a yes-instance. As B = k and |V | = |A| = n, the
lower bounds follow.
4.3 Fair Knapsack
Let us now turn to the problem of computing a fair knapsack. We first prove that the prob-
lem is NP-hard, even for restricted cases, and then we study its parameterized complexity.
Theorem 6. Fair Knapsack is NP-hard, even
1. for one voter;
2. for two voters and when all costs are equal to one;
3. if all utilities are in {0, 1} and all costs are equal to one.
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Proof. (1): We provide a many-one reduction from the Partition problem [20]: Given a
set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of n positive integers, the question is to decide whether there exists a
subset S′ ⊆ S such that
∑
s∈S′ s =
1
2
∑
s∈S s. Given an instance (S) of Partition where all
integers are divisible by two, we construct an instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Let
T :=
∑
s∈S s. For each si ∈ S, we introduce an item ai with cost si. Further, we introduce
one voter v1 with utility u1(ai) = si for each i ∈ [n]. We set the budget B = T/2, and we
ask if there exists a knapsack with a Nash welfare W of at least T/2 + 1.
Let (S) be a yes-instance and let S′ ⊆ S be a solution. Then, the subset of items
A′ := {ai ∈ A | si ∈ S
′} forms a fair knapsack, as
∑
a∈A′ c(a) =
∑
s∈S′ s = T/2 ≤ B, and
the Nash welfare is at least 1 +
∑
a∈A′(u1(a)) = 1 +
∑
s∈S′ s = T/2 + 1
Conversely, let the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack be a yes-instance, and
let A′ ⊆ A be a fair knapsack. Denote by S′ the subset of integers in S corresponding to
the items in A′. Then it holds that
∑
s∈S′ s =
∑
a∈A′ c(a) ≤ T/2. Moreover, 1 +
∑
s∈S′ s =
1+
∑
a∈A′(u1(a)) ≥ T/2+1. Together, both inequalities yield
∑
s∈S′ s = T/2, and hence S
′
forms a solution to (S).
(2): We provide a many-one reduction from the Exact Partition problem: Given a
set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of n positive integers and an integer k ≥ 1, decide whether there is
a subset S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = k such that
∑
s∈S′ s =
1
2
∑
s∈S s. Given an instance (S, k)
of Exact Partition where all integers are divisible by two and by k, we construct an
instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Similarly as before we set T :=
∑
s∈S s. For each
si ∈ S, we introduce an item ai with cost 1. Further, we introduce two voters, v1 and v2,
with utility functions u1(ai) = T + si and u2(ai) = T +
T
k
− si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively.
We set the budget B = k and ask for a knapsack with a Nash welfare W at least equal
to (1 + kT + T/2)2.
Let (S, k) be a yes-instance and let S′ ⊆ S be a solution. We claim that the sub-
set of items A′ := {ai ∈ A | si ∈ S
′} forms an appropriate fair knapsack. It holds
that
∑
a∈A′ c(a) = |S
′| = k ≤ B. The Nash welfare is at least(
1 +
∑
a∈A′
u1(a)
)
·
(
1 +
∑
a∈A′
u2(a)
)
=
(
1 + kT +
∑
s∈S′
s
)
·
(
1 + kT +
∑
s∈S′
(
T
k
− s
))
= (1 + kT + T/2)
(
1 + kT + T −
∑
s∈S′
s
)
= (1 + kT + T/2)2 .
Conversely, let the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack be a yes-instance, and
let A′ ⊆ A be a corresponding fair knapsack. Let S′ denote the subset of integers in S
corresponding to the items in A′. Then it holds true that |S′| =
∑
a∈A′ c(a) ≤ B = k.
Moreover, for each item a ∈ A it holds true that u1(a) + u2(a) = 2T + T/k, and hence∑
a∈A′(u1(a)+u2(a)) = |A
′|(2T+T/k). The product (1+
∑
a∈A′ u1(a))·(1+
∑
a∈A′ u2(a)) is
maximal if
∑
a∈A′ u1(a) =
∑
a∈A′ u2(a), leading to
∑
a∈A′ u1(a) = |A
′|
(
T + T2k
)
. Together,
it follows that |A′| = k, and hence S′ forms a solution for (S, k).
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(3): We provide a many-one reduction from the Exact Regular Set Packing (ERSP)
problem (there is a straight-forward parameterized reduction from Exact Regular In-
dependent Set [1]): Given a set X, set F = {F1, . . . , Fm} of subsets of X with |Fi| = d
for all i ∈ [m], and an integer k ≥ 1, decide whether there exists a subset F ′ ⊆ F
with |F ′| = k such that for each distinct F,F ′ ∈ F it holds true that F ∩ F ′ = ∅. Let
(X = {x1, . . . , xn},F = {F1, . . . , Fm}, k) be an instance of ERSP where |Fi| = d for all
i ∈ [m]. We construct an instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Let A := {ai | Fi ∈ F} be
the set of items each with cost equal to one. Further, we introduce n voters with ui(aj) = 1
if xi ∈ Fj , and ui(aj) = 0 otherwise, for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. We set B = k and the desired
Nash welfare to W = 2dk. This finishes the construction.
Assume that (X,F , k) admits a solution F ′. We claim that A′ := {ai ∈ A | Fi ∈ F
′}
is a fair knapsack with the desired value of the Nash welfare (note that |A′| = k). By the
construction, each item a ∈ A contributes one to exactly d voters. Moreover, each distinct
a, a′ ∈ A′ contribute to disjoint sets of voters. Hence,
∏
1≤i≤n
(
1 +
∑
a∈A′
ui(a)
)
= 2dk.
Conversely, let A′ ⊆ A be a fair knapsack, and let F ′ = {Fi ∈ F | ai ∈ A
′}. We claim
that F ′ forms a solution to (X,F , k). First, observe that
∑
1≤i≤n
∑
a∈A′ ui(a) = |A
′|d. Let
M := {i ∈ [n] | xi ∈
⋃
F ′} be the set of elements covered by F ′. Note that 1 ≤ |M | ≤ |A′|·d.
Then
∏
i∈M
(
1 +
∑
a∈A′
ui(a)
)
≤
(
1 +
|A′|d
|M |
)|M |
≤ 2|A
′|d ≤ 2kd.
For the second inequality, observe that the function (1+ y/x)x is increasing on the interval
(0, y] for every y > 0. Hence, we have that |A′| = k and |M | = k · d. Thus, F ′ is a set of
exactly k pairwise disjoint sets.
The proof of Theorem 6 (3) uses the reduction from Exact Regular Set Packing
(ERSP). Since ERSP is W[1]-hard with respect to the size of the solution [1], we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. Fair Knapsack is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the budget, even if all
utilities are in {0, 1} and all costs are equal to one.
Using a different construction, we can show that for the combination of the two
parameters—the number of voters and the budget—we still get fixed-parameter intractabil-
ity.
Theorem 7. Fair Knapsack is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of voters
and the budget, even if the utilities and the budget are represented in unary encoding and
the costs of all items are equal to one.
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· · · n2j · · · n
2
ℓ
· · · · · · {n1i , n
2
j} · · ·
v1
v2
...
v1{1,2}
...
vk−2{1,2}
...
...
va(1,2)
vb(1,2)
va(2,1)
vb(2,1)
...
T · · · T · · · T
T · · · T · · · T
· · ·
T
...
T
1 · · · i · · · ℓ T − i
T − 1 · · · T − i · · · T − ℓ i
1 · · · j · · · ℓ T − j
T − 1 · · · T − j · · · T − ℓ j
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0
(1)
(2)
(3)
, V (G) , E(G)
Figure 1: Illustration of the instance obtained in the proof of Theorem 7. Herein, ncb denotes
vertex b in color class c, where each color class contains ℓ vertices. In the presented example, the
vertices n1i and n
2
j are adjacent. Blocks containing a zero indicate that the corresponding entries
are zero.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the k-Multicolored Clique problem,
which is known to be W[1]-hard with respect to the number of colors. Let I be an instance
of k-Multicolored Clique. In I we are given a graph G with the set V (G) of vertices
and the set E(G) of edges, a natural number k ∈ N, and a coloring function f : V (G)→ [k]
that assigns one of k colors to each vertex. We ask if G contains k pairwise connected
vertices, each having a different color. Without loss of generality we assume that k ≥ 2.
From I we construct an instance IF of Fair Knapsack as follows (we refer to Figure 1
for an illustration). Let T = |V (G)|. We set the set of items to V (G) ∪ E(G), that is we
associate one item with each vertex and with each edge. We construct the set of voters as
follows (unless specified otherwise, by default we assume that a voter assigns utility of zero
to an item):
1. For each color we introduce one voter who assigns utility of T to each vertex with this
color. Clearly, there are k such voters.
2. For each pair of two different colors we introduce k − 2 voters, each assigning utility of
T to each edge that connects two vertices with these two colors. There are (k − 2)
(
k
2
)
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such voters.
3. For each ordered pair of colors, c1 and c2, with c1 6= c2 we introduce two voters, call
them a and b, with the following utilities. Consider the set of vertices with color c1 and
rename them in an arbitrary way so that they can be put in a sequence n1, n2, . . . , nℓ.
For each i ∈ [ℓ] voter a assigns utility i to vertex ni and utility (T − i) to each edge
that connects ni with a vertex with color c2. Voter b assigns utility (T − i) to ni and
utility i to each edge that connects ni with a vertex with color c2. There are 2k(k − 1)
such voters.
We set the cost of each item to one, and the total budget to B = k +
(
k
2
)
. By a simple
calculation one can check that the total number of voters is equal to k + (k − 2) ·
(
k
2
)
+
2k(k − 1) = kB. This completes our construction.
First, observe that in total each item is assigned utility kT from all the voters. Indeed,
each item corresponding to a vertex gets utility of T from exactly one voter from the first
group, and total utility of (k − 1) · T from 2(k − 1) voters from the third group. Similarly,
each item corresponding to an edge gets utility of T from k − 2 voters from the second
group, and total utility of 2 ·T from four voters from the third group. Thus, independently
of how we select B items, the sum of the utilities they are assigned from the voters will
always be the same, that is BkT . Thus, clearly the Nash welfare would be maximized if
the total utility assigned to the selected items by each voter is the same, and equal to T .
Only in such case the Nash welfare would be equal to (T + 1)kB . We will show, however,
that each voter assigns to the set of B items utility T if and only if k out of such items are
vertices with k different colors, the remaining
(
k
2
)
of such items are edges, and each selected
edge connects two selected vertices.
Indeed, it is easy to see that if the selected set of items has the structure as described
above, then each voter assigns to this set the utility of T . We will now prove the other
implication. Assume that for the set of B items S each voter assigns total utility of T . By
looking at the first group of voters, we infer that k items from S correspond to the vertices,
and that these k vertices have different colors. By looking at the second group of voters,
we infer that for each pair of two different colors, S contains exactly one edge connecting
vertices with such colors. Finally, by looking at the third group of voters we infer that each
edge from S that connects colors c1 and c2 is adjacent to the vertices from S with colors c1
and c2. This completes the proof.
By Theorem 7 we presumably cannot hope for an FPT algorithm for Fair Knapsack
when parameterized by the number n of voters. However, each instance I of Fair Knap-
sack with unarily encoded utilities is solvable in O(|I|f(n)) time (that is, it is in XP when
parameterized by n), where f is some computable function only depending on n.
Theorem 8. For unarily encoded utilities, Fair Knapsack is in XP when parameterized
by the number of voters.
Proof. We provide an algorithm based on dynamic programing. We construct a table T
where for each sequence of n + 1 integers, z1, z2, . . . , zn, and i, entry T [z1, z2, . . . , zn, i]
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represents the lowest possible value of the budget x such that there exists a knapsack S
with the following properties: (i) the total cost of all items in the knapsack is equal to x (i.e.,
x =
∑
a∈S c(a)), (ii) the last index of an item in the knapsack S is i (i.e., i = maxaj∈S j),
and (iii) for each voter vj we have that
∑
a∈S uj(a) = zj. This table can be constructed
recursively:
T [z1, z2, . . . , zn, i] = c(ai) + min
j≤i
T [z1 − u1(ai), . . . , zn − un(ai), j].
We handle the corner cases by setting T [0, 0, . . . , 0, i] = 0 for each i, and T [z1, z2, . . . , zn, i] =
∞ whenever zi < 0 for some i ∈ [n].
Clearly, if n is fixed and if the utilities are represented in unary encoding, then the table
can be filled in polynomial time. Now, it is sufficient to traverse the table and to find the
entry T [z1, z2, . . . , zn, i] ≤ B which maximizes
∏n
j=1(zj + 1).
On the positive side, with stronger requirements on the voters’ utilities, that is, if the
number of different values over the utilities is small, we can strengthen Theorem 8 and
prove membership in FPT (using integer linear programming).
Theorem 9. Fair Knapsack is FPT when parameterized by the combination of the num-
ber of voters and the number of different values that a utility function can take.
Proof. We will use the classic result of Lenstra [24] which says that an integer linear program
(ILP) can be solved in FPT time with respect to the number of integer variables. We will
also use a recent result of Bredereck et al. [5] who proved that one can apply concave/convex
transformations of certain variables in an ILP, and that such a modified program can be
still solved in an FPT time. We construct an ILP as follows. Let U be the set of values
that a utility function can take. For each vector z = (z1, . . . , zn) with zi ∈ U for each i, we
define Az as the set of items a such that for each voter vi we have ui(a) = zi. Intuitively, Az
describes a subcollection of the items with the same “type”: such items are indistinguishable
when we look only at the utilities assigned by the voters; they may vary only with their
costs. For each such a set Az we introduce an integer variable xz which intuitively denotes
the number of items from the optimal solution that belong to Az. Further, we construct a
function fz such that fz(x) is the cost of the x cheapest items from Az; clearly fz is convex.
We formulate the following program:
maximize:
∑
vi∈V
log
(∑
z∈Un
zi · xz
)
subject to:
∑
z∈Un
fz(xz) ≤ B
xz ∈ Z, z ∈ U
n
The above program uses concave transformations (logarithms) for the maximized expression,
and convex transformations (functions fz) in the left-hand sides of the constraints, so we
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can use the result of Bredereck et al. [5] and claim that this program can be solved in an
FPT time with respect to the number of integer variables. This completes the proof.
4.4 Fair Knapsack under Restricted Domains
In contrast to Individually Best Knapsack and Diverse Knapsack, both being solv-
able in polynomial time on restricted domains, Fair Knapsack remains NP-hard on utility
profiles that are even both, single-peaked and single-crossing.
Theorem 10. Fair Knapsack is NP-hard even on single-peaked single-crossing domains,
when the costs of all items are equal to one, and the utilities of each voter come from the
set {0, . . . , 6}.
Proof. We give a many-one reduction from the NP-hard Exact-Set-Cover (X3C) prob-
lem: Given a universe U with 3k elements and a set F of 3-sized subsets of U , the question is
to decide whether there exist exactly k subsets in F that cover U . Without loss of general-
ity, we can additionally assume that each element in U appears in exactly three sets from F .
Given an instance (U = {e1, . . . , en},F = {F1, . . . , Fm}) of X3C (note that n = m = 3k),
we compute an instance of the problem of computing a fair knapsack as follows (the utilities
of the voters are depicted in Figure 2).
First, for each i ∈ [m], we introduce two items, ai and a2m−i, that correspond to set Fi,
each with the cost of one. Further, we introduce three different types of voters:
(1) We add two voters x1 and x2 with ux1(ai) = ux1(am+i) − 6 = 0 and ux2(am+i) =
ux2(ai)− 6 = 0 for all i ∈ [m].
(2) For each i ∈ [m], we add two voters y
(i)
1 and y
(i)
2 with
u
y
(i)
1
(aj) =


0, 1 ≤ j ≤ i,
3, i < j < 2m− i+ 1,
6, 2m− i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m,
and u
y
(i)
2
(aj) = uy(i)1
(a2m−j+1).
(3) For each i ∈ [n], we add two voters z
(i)
1 and z
(i)
2 with uz(i)1
(aj) = fi(aj) and uz(i)2
(aj) =
u
z
(i)
1
(a2m−j+1), where for j ∈ [m]
fi(aj) = |{ℓ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j, ei ∈ Fℓ}|,
fi(a2m−j+1) = 3 + |{ℓ | j ≤ ℓ ≤ m, ei ∈ Fℓ}|.
We set the budget to B = 2k and the required Nash welfare to W = (6k+1)2+2m(6k+2)2n.
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′
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′
2 a
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1
x1 0
6
x2 0
6
y
(i)
1 0
3
6
y
(i)
2 0
3
6
z
(ℓ)
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z
(ℓ)
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56
Figure 2: Visualization of the utilities of the voters used in the proof of Theorem 9. The solid lines
can be interpreted as plots depicting the utilities of the voters from different items. For instance,
agent x1 assigns utility of 0 to the items a1, . . . am, and utility of 6 to the items am+1, . . . a2m (note
that a′j = a2m−j+1). Agents z
(ℓ)
1 and z
(ℓ)
2 depicted in the figure correspond to the element eℓ such
that eℓ ∈ F2 ∩ Fi ∩ Fm.
It is apparent that with the order (a1, . . . , a2m), this profile is single-peaked. For single-
crossingness, note that the utilities of agents xi, y
(j)
i , z
(j′)
i are increasing over (a1, . . . , a2m)
if i = 1, and decreasing, if i = 2. Hence, the order of voters
(x1, y
(1)
1 , . . . , y
(1)
m , z
(1)
1 , . . . , z
(1)
m , x2, y
(2)
1 , . . . , y
(2)
m , z
(2)
1 , . . . , z
(2)
m )
witnesses single-crossingness.
We will prove that (U = {e1, . . . , e3k},F = {F1, . . . , Fm}) is a yes-instance for X3C if
and only if the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack is a yes-instance.
(⇒) Let F ′ = {Fb1 , . . . , Fbk} ⊆ F be an exact cover of U . We claim that S =
{abi , a2m−bi+1 | i ∈ [k]} is a fair knapsack. First observe that c(S) = 2k ≤ B. We
consider the welfare for each of the three types (1)–(3) of voters separately.
For x1 and x2 (1), we have
∑
a∈S ux1(a) =
∑
a∈S ux2(a) = 6k.
Next, consider the voters of type (2). Consider y
(i)
1 , i ∈ [m]:
k∑
j=1
[u
y
(i)
1
(abj ) + uy(i)1
(a2m−bj+1)] =
∑
1≤bj≤i
[u
y
(i)
1
(abj ) + uy(i)1
(a2m−bj+1)]
+
∑
i<bj≤m
[u
y
(i)
1
(abj ) + uy(i)1
(a2m−bj+1)]
19
=
∣∣{j | 1 ≤ bj ≤ i}∣∣ · (0 + 6) + ∣∣{j | i < bj ≤ m}∣∣ · (3 + 3)
= 6k.
By symmetry,
∑k
j=1[uy(i)2
(abj ) + uy(i)2
(a2m−bj+1)] = 6k.
Finally, consider the voters of type (3). Consider a voter z
(i)
1 , i ∈ [m]. Let j
∗ be the
index such that ei ∈ Fbj∗ (recall exact cover). We have
∑
a∈S
u
z
(i)
1
(a) =
k∑
j=1
[fi(abj ) + fi(a2m−bj+1)]
= fi(abj∗ ) + fi(a2m−bj∗+1) +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
[fi(abj ) + fi(a2m−bj+1)]
= 6 + 1 +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
(
|{ℓ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ bj , ei ∈ Fℓ}|+ 3 + |{ℓ | bj ≤ ℓ ≤ m, ei ∈ Fℓ}|
)
= 6 + 1 +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
(|{ℓ | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, ei ∈ Fℓ}|+ 3) +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
∣∣{ei} ∩ Fbj ∣∣
= 6 + 1 +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
6 +
∑
j∈[k]\{j∗}
0
= 6k + 1
By symmetry,
∑
a∈S uz(i)2
(a) = 6k + 1.
Hence, we get in total that the Nash welfare is equal to
(1 + 6k)2(1 + 6k)2m(2 + 6k)2n =W .
(⇐) Let S ⊆ {a1, . . . , a2m} be a fair knapsack with c(S) ≤ 2k and with the Nash welfare
at least equal to W . We will now show that the total utility that all voters assign to each
item aj ∈ A is equal to 6 + 6m + 6n + 3. Indeed, the two voters from (1) assign to aj
the total utility of 6. Similarly, any pair of voters, y
(i)
1 and y
(i)
2 , assigns utility of 6 to aj .
Finally, observe that, whenever ei ∈ Fj , then voters z
(i)
1 and z
(i)
2 assign utility of 7 to aj ;
otherwise they assign utility of 6 to aj. Since each set Fj contains exactly 3 elements, we
get that aj gets total utility of (n− 3)6 + 3 · 7 from the voters from (3).
Hence, 2k items contribute 2k(6+6m+6n+3) to the total utility, and so, for the Nash
welfare to be equal to W , this total utility must be distributed as equally as possible among
the voters. Specifically, 2m+2 voters need to get the total utility of 6k, and 2n voters must
get the total utility of 6k + 1.
Now, we claim that for each i ∈ [m], ai ∈ S ⇐⇒ a2m−i+1 ∈ S. Suppose this is not
the case, and let i ∈ [m] be the smallest index such that either (i) ai ∈ S ∧ a2m−i+1 6∈ S
or (ii) ai 6∈ S ∧ a2m−i+1 ∈ S. Consider the first case (i). Let k1 = |{1 ≤ j ≤ i | aj ∈ S}|
and k2 = |{2m − i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m | aj ∈ S}|. It holds that k1 ≥ k2 + 1, and it follows for
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voter y
(i)
2 that ∑
aj∈S
u
y
(i)
2
(aj) = k16 + (2k − (k1 + k2)) · 3 + k2 · 0
= 3(2k + (k1 − k2))
≥ 6k + 3 /∈ {6k, 6k + 1}.
Case (ii) works analogously, and hence, our claim follows. From this we infer
that
∑
a∈S uy(ℓ)i
(a) = 6k for each i ∈ {1, 2} and ℓ ∈ [m], and that
∑
a∈S uxi(a) = 6k for
each i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, for each voter z from (3) it must be the case that
∑
a∈S uz(a) = 6k+1.
Finally, we will prove that F ′ = {Fb1 , . . . , Fbk} = {Fi ∈ F | ai ∈ S, i ∈ [m]} forms a
cover of U . Towards a contradiction suppose that there is an element ei ∈ U such that ei
is not covered by F ′. We consider voter z
(i)
1 . Observe that since ei 6∈ Fbj for each j ∈ [k],
we have ∑
j∈[k]
(
u
z
(i)
1
(abj ) + uz(i)1
(a2m−bj+1)
)
=
∑
j∈[k]
6 = 6k < 6k + 1.
Thus, we reached a contradiction, and consequently we get that every element in U is
covered by F . This completes the proof.
As we discussed in Section 2, if the voters’ utilities come from the binary set {0, 1} and
if the costs of the items are equal to one, then Fair Knapsack is equivalent to computing
winners according to Proportional Approval Voting. For this case with single-peaked pref-
erences, Peters [29] showed that the problem can be formulated as an integer linear program
with totally unimodular constraints, and thus it is solvable in polynomial time. This makes
our result interesting, as it shows that by allowing slightly more general utilities (coming
from the set {0, . . . , 6} instead of {0, 1}) the problem becomes already NP-hard (even if we
additionally assume single-crossingness of the preferences).
5 Conclusion
We studied three variants of the knapsack problem in multiagent settings. One of these
variants, selecting an individually best knapsack, has been considered in the literature
before, and our work introduces the other two concepts: diverse and fair knapsack. Our
paper establishes a relation between the multiagent knapsack model and a broad literature
including work on multiwinner voting and on fair allocation. This way, we expose a variety
of ways in which the preferences of the voters can be aggregated in different applications
that are captured by the abstract model of the multiagent knapsack problem.
Our complexity results are outlined in Table 1. In summary, we showed that computing
an individually best or a diverse knapsack can be done efficiently under some constraints.
On the contrary, we give multiple evidences that computing a fair knapsack is computa-
tionally hard. This also motivates the study of approximation and heuristic algorithms for
computing a fair knapsack.
21
References
[1] G. Ausiello, A. D’Atri, and M. Protasi. Structure preserving reductions among convex
optimization problems. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 21:136–153, 1980.
[2] N. Benabbou and P. Perny. Solving multi-agent knapsack problems using incremental
approval voting. In Proceedings of the 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence (ECAI-16), pages 1318–1326, 2016.
[3] G. Benade, S. Nath, A. Procaccia, and N. Shah. Preference elicitation for participa-
tory budgeting. In Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI-17), pages 376–382, 2017.
[4] N. Betzler, A. Slinko, and J. Uhlmann. On the computation of fully proportional
representation. J. of Artificial Intelligence Research, 47:475–519, 2013.
[5] R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, P. Skowron, and N. Talmon. Mixed inte-
ger programming with convex/concave constraints: Fixed-parameter tractability and
applications to multicovering and voting. Technical Report arXiv:1709.02850 [cs.DS],
arXiv.org, 2017.
[6] J. Byrka, T. Pensyl, B. Rybicki, J. Spoerhase, A. Srinivasan, and K. Trinh. An im-
proved approximation algorithm for knapsack median using sparsification. In Proceed-
ings of 23rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA-2015), pages 275–287,
2015.
[7] Y. Cabannes. Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory
democracy. Environment and Urbanization, 16(1):27–46, 2004.
[8] I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. Procaccia, N. Shah, and J. Wang. The
unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash Welfare. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-16), pages 305–322, 2016.
[9] B. Chamberlin and P. Courant. Representative deliberations and representative de-
cisions: Proportional representation and the Borda rule. American Political Science
Review, 77(3):718–733, 1983.
[10] V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. Fair public decision making. In Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-17), pages 629–646,
2017.
[11] A. Darmann and J. Schauer. Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating
indivisible goods. European Journal of Operational Research, 247(2):548–559, 2015.
[12] R. Downey and M. Fellows. Fundamentals of Parameterized Complexity. Texts in
Computer Science. Springer, 2013.
22
[13] E. Elkind, M. Lackner, and D. Peters. Structured preferences. In U. Endriss, editor,
Trends in Computational Social Choice. AI Access, 2017.
[14] B. Fain, A. Goel, and K. Munagala. The core of the participatory budgeting problem.
In Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE-16),
pages 384–399, 2016.
[15] B. Fain, K. Munagala, and N. Shah. Fair public decision making. In Proceedings of
the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-18), pages 575–592,
2018.
[16] P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, and N. Talmon. Multiwinner voting: A new
challenge for social choice theory. In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational
Social Choice. AI Access, 2017.
[17] F. Zanjirani Farahani and M. Hekmatfar, editors. Facility Location: Concepts, Models,
and Case Studies. Springer, 2009.
[18] Z. Fitzsimmons. Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy. In Proceedings of
the 17th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-15),
pages 127–140, 2015.
[19] R. Freeman, S. Zahedi, and V. Conitzer. Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic
settings. In Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI-17), pages 4580–4587, 2017.
[20] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of
NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979.
[21] A. Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, S. Sakshuwong, and T. Aitamurto. Knapsack voting:
Voting mechanisms for participatory budgeting. Manuscript, 2016.
[22] Hans Kellerer, Ulrich Pferschy, and David Pisinger. Knapsack problems. Springer,
2004. ISBN 978-3-540-40286-2.
[23] Frank Kelly. Charging and rate control for elastic traffic. European Transactions on
Telecommunications, 8:33–37, 1997.
[24] H. Lenstra, Jr. Integer programming with a fixed number of variables. Mathematics
of Operations Research, 8(4):538–548, 1983.
[25] T. Lu and C. Boutilier. Budgeted social choice: From consensus to personalized deci-
sion making. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pages 280–286, 2011.
[26] T. Lust and J. Teghem. The multiobjective multidimensional knapsack problem: a
survey and a new approach. International Transactions in Operational Research, 19
(4):495–520, 2012.
23
[27] H. Moulin. Fair Division and Collective Welfare. The MIT Press, 2003.
[28] J. Nash. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2):155–162, 1950.
[29] D. Peters. Single-peakedness and total unimodularity: New polynomial-time algo-
rithms for multi-winner elections. In Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18), 2018. To appear.
[30] A. Procaccia, J. Rosenschein, and A. Zohar. On the complexity of achieving propor-
tional representation. Social Choice and Welfare, 30(3):353–362, 2008.
[31] P. Skowron, L. Yu, P. Faliszewski, and E. Elkind. The complexity of fully proportional
representation for single-crossing electorates. Theoretical Computer Science, 569:43–57,
2015.
[32] M. Sviridenko. A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack
constraint. Operations Research Letters, 32(1):41–43, 2004.
24
